# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JOSEPH AARON HODGE,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,

Civil Action
No. 16-cv-06952 (JBS-AMD)

v.

CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,

OPINION

Defendant.

#### APPEARANCES:

Joseph Aaron Hodge, Plaintiff Pro Se 3 Delaware Road Lindenwold, NJ 08021

## SIMANDLE, Chief District Judge:

## I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Joseph Aaron Hodge seeks to bring a civil rights complaint against Camden County Correctional Facility ("CCCF") pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket Entry 1.

28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua

sponte screening for dismissal under Section 1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court will dismiss the Complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. \$ 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).

# II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's Complaint states: "During my times of incarceration I never slept on a bunk. It was always only a choice of either sleeping on the floor under the bottom bunk, under the table or stretched from toilet to the door." Complaint § III(C). Plaintiff contends: "Sometimes there can be up to 5 inmates in a room only big enough for 2 men. That results to [sic] 3 people sleeping on the floor." Id.

Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to these claims occurred: "September 2004[;] June, July, September and October of 2007." Id. § III(B).

Plaintiff contends that he has "back problems that have probably occurred due to me sleeping on the floor. I haven't received any medical treatment." Id. § IV.

Plaintiff seeks "due compensation for the terrible accommodations."  $\mathit{Id}$ . §  $\mathsf{V}$ .

#### III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To survive *sua sponte* screening under 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege

"sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). "[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

## IV. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts claims against CCCF for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement.

Primarily, the Complaint must be dismissed as CCCF is not a "state actor" within the meaning of § 1983. See, e.g., Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538-39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a "person" under § 1983). Accordingly, the claims against CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice.

Furthermore, "plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal should receive leave to amend unless amendment would be inequitable under [§ 1915] or futile." Grayson v. Mayview

State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court denies

leave to amend at this time as Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the statute of limitations, which is governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). The accrual date of a § 1983 action is determined by federal law, however. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007); Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). "Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based." Montanez, 773 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiff states that the alleged events giving rise to these claims occurred: "September 2004[;] June, July, September and October of 2007." Complaint § III(B). The allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff at the time of detention. Accordingly, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's claims expired in October 2009. As there are no grounds for equitable

 $<sup>^1</sup>$  "Although the running of the statute of limitations is ordinarily an affirmative defense, where that defense is obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under § 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim." Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 111-12 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam).

tolling of the statute of limitations, the Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice. Ostuni v. Wa Wa's Mart, 532 F. App'x 110, 112 (3d Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal with prejudice due to expiration of statute of limitations).

# V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim. An appropriate order follows.

February 9, 2017

s/ Jerome B. Simandle

Date

JEROME B. SIMANDLE Chief U.S. District Judge

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Equitable tolling "is only appropriate '(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff respecting the plaintiff's cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.'" Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App'x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Santos ex rel. Beato v. United States, 559 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2009)).